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Seminars
To stimulate research interactions and share experience and knowledge, DEM organizes different types of seminars:
Lunch Seminars in Economics and Management
These seminars host renown external researchers and benefit from the financial support of the FNR - National Research Fund:
We had the pleasure to welcome them during academic year: 2010-2011; 2011-2012; 2012-2013; 2013-2014;2014-2015; 2015-2016; 2016-2017; 2017-2018; 2018-2019
Research Seminars
They aim to present the work of our researchers or of their collaborators
Previous academic year: 2017-2018, 2016-2017 , 2018-2019, 2019-2020
Industry Seminar Series
The LCL Industry Seminar Series invites supply chain professionals to our campus to give presentations on their expertise. It is an important recurrent event for our centre, in which new insights and ideas are shared and discussed within an open setting.
Digital Supply Chain Roundtable Series
The Digital Supply Chain Roundtable Series provides a place where our supply chain community can regularly come together to discuss and interact about new discoveries, techniques and ideas. Participants collaborate, share business ideas and skill sets to strengthen their businesses together.
| Research Economic Seminar: Transboundary Haze Games: Local Capture and Common Agency | |
| Conférencier : | Ridwan D. Rusli, TU Köln, Germany |
| Lieu : |
Participation by invitation Online via Webex |
| Date de l'événement : | mardi, 11 mai 2021, 13:00 - 14:00 |
|
We study how transboundary, intergovernmental fire and haze negotiations interact with local, subnational government collusion and capture in a decentralized country. The local government collusion and capture problem is modelled as a competing principals and common agency problem that interacts with the central government's game of chicken. The results show that the central government can persuade farmers and prevent burning when the incremental benefits from slashing and burning are lower, the total direct and indirect costs and damages of fire and haze are higher and the required enforcement and abatement costs are not too high. Neighbouring governments can help mitigate the central government's budget constraint and help deter violating multinational companies. We develop a multitask multiprincipal framework to expand our solutions set to include partial burning outcomes and negative compensations. The results inform on a set of policy solutions to these complex transboundary fire and haze negotiation and local capture problems (+ d'infos) | |
