

Penultimate draft

## **Gettier for justification**

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### Abstract

I will present a problem for any externalist evidentialism that allows for accidental possession of evidence. There are Gettier cases for justification. I will describe two such cases – cases involving veridical hallucination. An analysis of the cases is given, along the lines of (reliabilist) virtue epistemology (cf. Sosa, Greco). The cases show that certain externalist evidentialist accounts of justification do not provide sufficient conditions. The reason lies in the fact that one can be luckily in possession of evidence, and then one will not have a justified belief. Justified belief requires an anti-luck condition on possession of evidence. This opens up the prospects of a unified virtue-epistemology covering both knowledge and justification.

### *1. Introduction*

Various attempts have been made in recent years to state necessary and sufficient conditions for having an (epistemically) justified belief. The matter is hotly debated and controversial, but some important attempts can be characterized quite succinctly, namely, in terms of *evidence* and *basing*. According to such accounts, *in nuce*, a subject's belief that p is justified just in case it is based on her possession of evidence, or more precisely:

- (E) A subject's belief that p is (*prima facie*) justified iff
  - (i) she possesses some evidence e for p and

- (ii) she bases her belief that p in the appropriate way on her possession of evidence e for p.<sup>1</sup>

Let us call accounts that conform to (E) ‘*evidentialist accounts of justification*,’ for obvious reasons.

Evidentialism in this sense is a generic approach that knows of various different species. The generic approach leaves open what counts as possession of evidence. We can distinguish between an *internalist* and an *externalist* version of evidentialism.<sup>2</sup> According to *internalist evidentialism*, possession of evidence supervenes on non-factive mental states, and essentially consists in (non-factive) mental states. Conee and Feldman are perhaps the paradigmatic internalist evidentialists.<sup>3</sup> According to *externalist evidentialism*, possession of evidence does not supervene on non-factive mental states and, thus, essentially involves some relation to something external. For example, possession of evidence might consist in knowing facts (Timothy Williamson), or in justfiedly believing facts, or in non-conceptually, non-doxastically perceiving facts.<sup>4</sup> Further proposals may be possible. The general question is

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<sup>1</sup> The qualification ‘in the appropriate way’ can be taken to be redundant, i.e., to be contained in the basing relation. I mention it here only to make clear that the appropriate way is included in (E). We can note that (E) is committed to the claim that doxastic justification is propositional justification plus (appropriate) basing (since clause (i) may quite naturally be taken to constitute propositional justification) and, thus, to the claim that propositional justification is prior to doxastic justification. This claim is, of course, controversial, and it has recently been criticized by John Turri. Cf. Turri (2010). But it is the rather ‘orthodox view’, as Turri admits.

<sup>2</sup> A similar distinction has been made, for example, by Nico Silins (2005).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Conee, Feldman (1985). Here I am concerned with doxastic justification, i.e., the justification of a subject’s belief (not with propositional justification, i.e., the justification of a subject to believe something). Correspondingly, one has to look at what Conee and Feldman call ‘well-foundedness’ of belief (and not to what they call ‘justification’). For possession of evidence Conee and Feldman clearly hold an internalist evidentialist view.

<sup>4</sup> For the first option see Williamson (2000). Williamson (2009) discusses the second option (and rejects it as unmotivated and “unnatural”) which is a variant of Goldman’s view. According to Goldman’s view, a proposition belongs to one’s evidence just in case it is (non-inferentially) justified for one. So evidence need not be true. Cf. Goldman (2009). The third

quite clear: what is the relation to an evidence fact that one has to enter into in order to count as possessing this fact as evidence?

Intuitively and arguably, for an externalist evidentialism, what one needs to be related to are facts speaking in favor of the relevant proposition, i.e., evidence facts, and I will assume so here without any further argument. (Facts can simply be taken to be true propositions, for the present purposes.) Possession of evidence then is factive, for the externalist evidentialist. I will also call facts that are evidence ‘reasons’ – without intending any kind of strong normativity or genuinely normative ‘ought’.<sup>5</sup>

Quite obviously, any account that appeals to justification in the possession of evidence has to face a serious threat of vicious *circularity*. If you already need to have justified belief in order to possess evidence, possession of evidence cannot explain justified belief – along the lines of evidentialism – in a non-circular way. Reduction is out of the question then. But this is not the problem that I am going to discuss here. Equally, if you appeal to knowledge in your account of possession of evidence, and knowledge entails justification, there is a –

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option is proposed in Hofmann (ms). Non-doxastic perceiving is perceiving without having the corresponding belief. (It is sometimes called ‘non-epistemic perceiving’, for example, by Dretske 1969.) – Whether Goldman’s non-factive option counts as an externalist evidentialism depends on whether (propositional) justification is externalist. In the following I will ignore this option and restrict myself to factive conceptions of evidence. For a defense of factivity, see Williamson (2000) and Williamson (2009).

<sup>5</sup> I leave open the possibility of genuinely normative epistemic reasons. But I do not think that genuinely normative reasons can be analyzed in terms of evidence, as Kearns and Star have proposed. Cf. Kearns, Star (2009), Kearns, Star (2008). All I intend here is an identification of evidence and *non-normative* epistemic reasons. There might be normative epistemic reasons, but except for rejecting the identification of these with evidence, I remain neutral about normative epistemic reasons here. In particular, the view that believing for the reason that p requires knowing that p (to be found in the works of Unger and Hyman, e.g.) rests on a notion of *normative* reasons and, therefore, is not directly applicable to the issues of having evidence (non-normative epistemic reasons) and basing one’s belief on one’s evidence. (Cf. Unger 1975 and Hyman 1999, e.g.) So ‘believing for the reason that p’ where the concept of a normative reason is at stake, is not to be identified with basing one’s belief on the evidence that p. This deserves further investigation which I do not have the space to engage in here.

perhaps more subtle – question about circularity, too. Then for any justified belief which is not itself knowledge, its justification depends (metaphysically) on some other belief's (or other beliefs') being justified (and knowledge). It is not entirely clear how bad this situation is, and further careful reflection would be required to assess the situation properly. But again, this possible threat of circularity is not going to be the problem that will be presented in the following. Of course, any account that appeals to non-conceptual, non-doxastic perceiving as constituting possession of evidence does not face any such threat and, thus, clearly opens up the way for a reductive analysis of justified belief in the evidentialist way. (Unsurprisingly, this would be my favorite account of evidence possession.)

Intuitively, externalist evidentialism seems quite attractive to anyone with externalist leanings, especially once one realizes that a pure reliabilist account of epistemic justification has to face serious problems.<sup>6</sup> But there is a certain problem to be taken into account. I shall argue that externalist evidentialist accounts à la (E) *cannot yield sufficient conditions for justified belief unless their account of possession of evidence comprises an anti-luck condition*. For, *there are Gettier cases for justification* – my main claim in this paper. That is, as long as one can be in possession of evidence in a certain accidental way, one can luckily possess evidence and then one's belief is not justified (even if based appropriately on one's evidence). As long as lucky possession of evidence is allowed (by one's favorite account of possession of evidence) one can have rational, evidenced belief which is not justified. (I will use this technical term, 'evidenced', just for lack of a better one. A belief that p is evidenced, by definition, if and only if there is some evidence for p. It is supported by some evidence, as it were. Or, as one could say, it is in accordance with reasons.) The belief is formed in a rational way, by exercising a rational capacity in the exploitation of one's evidence. It is evidenced since there is evidence for it. But this need not amount to a justified belief. Conditions (i) and (ii) are not sufficient.

Of course, all of this can be excluded from the very beginning by *including an anti-luck condition* into one's definition of possession of evidence. Then the problem is accounted for from the very beginning. But the important point remains intact. One must be non-accidentally, non-luckily in possession of evidence in order to have a justified belief. Any account of possession of evidence which allows for accidental possession of evidence will not

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<sup>6</sup> For some central problems of reliabilism, such as the generality problem and problems surrounding defeaters, see, for example, Goldman (2008) and Hofmann (2013a).

generate sufficient conditions for justification, by way of (E). In this sense, justification essentially embodies an anti-luck condition, just as knowledge does (as virtue-epistemologists have argued from Gettier cases for knowledge). And this, of course, points to a certain *unified* virtue epistemology of both knowledge and justification. Furthermore, if possession of evidence is understood in such a way as to include the relevant anti-luck condition, one loses the ability to distinguish between lucky and non-lucky possession of evidence. And then one will be unable to describe the Gettier cases for justification in an appropriate way. (One may define a notion of ‘quasi-possession of evidence’ which leaves out the anti-luck condition and keeps everything else in order to be able to describe all cases adequately. But then one has merely shifted the terminology. Accidental possession of evidence would have been renamed ‘quasi-possession of evidence’.)

My claim is not only that there are such (hypothetical or actual) Gettier cases for justification. I will also describe such cases. I will present two (hypothetical) cases involving *veridical hallucination*. In these cases of veridical hallucination, the subject can acquire rational, evidenced belief which is not justified. The belief is evidenced, but only in a quite accidental way, since the hallucination is veridical only by mere luck.

It is widely assumed that justification does not entail truth, and I agree. So all the considerations put forward here are consistent with the possibility of false justified beliefs. Indeed, one Gettier case for justification that I will describe below concerns a false belief (i.e., the second case). The issue of justification is thus independent of truth. To consider Gettier cases for justification which involve false belief is helpful for keeping the issue of justification separate from the issue of knowledge. A Gettier case for justification need not be a Gettier case for knowledge.

I will end by presenting a short diagnosis of what goes wrong in Gettier cases for justification. The diagnosis is structurally similar to the virtue view of knowledge in Greco, Sosa, and Pritchard, but it concerns justification instead of knowledge.<sup>7</sup> In essence, the diagnosis is that the right connection between rational competence and evidence is missing. The belief is rational and evidenced, but it is *not* evidenced *because* rational. More precisely, the status of being evidenced is not explained by the exercise of a reason tracking competence (a rational capacity or competence). Rather it is due to luck. (In the cases described, the element of luck is contained in the fact that the hallucination is luckily veridical.) Thus, we

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<sup>7</sup> Cf. Sosa (2007), Greco (2010), Pritchard (2012).

have the same abstract structure as in Gettier cases for knowledge. A certain epistemic status of a belief (being true – being evidenced) is reached and a competence is exercised (truth tracking competence – reason tracking competence), but the status is *not* reached *because* of the exercise of the competence. Justification, then, is analogous to knowledge: the achievement of the relevant status by the exercise of a corresponding competence. This is what ultimately makes the cases described below Gettier cases for justification.<sup>8</sup>

An important qualification has to be noted at the beginning. We should pause for a second to reflect on what is meant by ‘(epistemic) justification’ here. I take it that the term ‘justified belief’ is not univocal.<sup>9</sup> It can be used to denote various (similar but) different concepts: blameless (or responsible) belief,<sup>10</sup> rational belief, reasons-related belief, entitled belief, and possibly even further concepts.<sup>11</sup> It is rather uninteresting to debate which one really deserves to be called ‘justified belief’. What is important for epistemology is to see the differences and commonalities that are relevant for the epistemic status of a belief. Here I will focus on ‘justified belief’ in the sense of reasons-related belief, i.e., belief which is appropriately linked to some objective piece of evidence (reason).<sup>12</sup> (Of course, an internalist

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<sup>8</sup> The luck involved in Gettier cases for justification is structurally of the same kind as the one involved in standard Gettier cases for knowledge. Roughly speaking, it is a kind of epistemic luck which is present whenever one exercises a rational capacity and reaches a belief with the corresponding standing but not due to, or because of, the exercise of the rational capacity. How this kind of luck is to be further characterized is a topic for another occasion. I tend to favor a safety account, similar to the one proposed by Pritchard (2005). That is, if one reaches evidenced belief competently, because of the exercise of a reason tracking competence, one’s belief could not easily have failed to be evidenced. Contra Pritchard (2012), I do not think that the ‘anti-luck intuition’ and the ‘ability intuition’ cannot be reconciled. The right account of the explanation of success from competence, embodying a safety condition, will do the job.

<sup>9</sup> One can find many statements to this effect in the recent literature. See, for example, Pryor (2001), 112.

<sup>10</sup> One might add praiseworthy belief, following Weatherson (2008).

<sup>11</sup> A similar list can be found in David (2005).

<sup>12</sup> Below I will spell out in more detail what is meant by ‘evidence’ and what the ‘appropriate link’ to evidence is. For more on reasons and evidence see, for example, Hofmann (2013a).

Pryor distinguishes various concepts of ‘justification’. Please note, however, that Pryor’s

may doubt that this concept is coherent, or that it is important. But at this point all I am saying is that we need to be clear about which concept we are addressing.) Concerning *this* concept of justification, I will argue that justification allows for Gettier cases and has a success-from-ability structure. The central question is: how does a belief have to be related to a reason in order to count as justified? It is quite clear that the subject must somehow ‘register’, ‘grasp’, or ‘be aware’ of the reason. But how exactly? The claim about the success-from-ability structure is supposed to answer this question.<sup>13</sup>

## 2. Two Gettier cases for justification

I will now describe two (hypothetical) cases in which a subject is in a Gettier condition with respect to justification. Both cases involve veridical hallucination. The first case is a case of a true belief, the second is a case of a false belief. Therefore, the second case is not a Gettier case for knowledge.

To begin with, in a case of veridical hallucination, as I understand it, a subject undergoes a perceptual experience whose perceptual representational content is correct (satisfied). We can assume that it is correct by mere luck. It is a mere coincidence that the way things appear to the hallucinating subject is indeed a way things are. I will assume, quite

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favorite concept of justification, ‘justificatorily supported belief’, is similar to the reasons-related concept but not the same, since it does not relate to the same concept of evidence (‘genuine support’). Cf. Pryor (2001), 112 and *passim*. Please also note that being supported by reasons (evidence) is not the same as being supported by some piece of (good) *reasoning*. Reasoning (or reflection) may bring in reasons (evidence) but it need not. Cf. Weatherson (2008), 563.

<sup>13</sup> I take it that the reasons-related concept of justification is a central concept of justification that plays a fundamental role. I do not have the time and space to go into this here. Suffice it so say that the rational belief concept of justification is in a certain sense dependent on the reasons-related concept of justification since the function or purpose of rational processing is to make use of one’s evidence as one’s evidence, roughly speaking. Blameless, praiseworthy, and responsible belief can be understood as subserving a function for the appropriate exploitation of one’s evidence, too.

uncontroversially, that a hallucination is not a perception, but involves a perceptual experience. So things appear to be a certain way to the subject. We can also suppose that the subject is not aware of undergoing a hallucination, but thinks that everything is normal or ordinary. So the two cases are cases of unrecognized veridical hallucination.

Consider the first case. Call it the ‘tomato case’. Suppose that Daniel has taken some drug and is hallucinating. His hallucination involves a perceptual experience as of a red, tomato-shaped object in front of him. So there appears to be a red, tomato-shaped object to him. In fact, and by mere coincidence, there is such a red, tomato-shaped object in front of him. So the representational content of his perceptual experience is correct (satisfied). But he is not perceiving. He is undergoing a veridical hallucination. The right kind of (causal, presumably) connection between the red tomato and his perceptual experience is missing.<sup>14</sup>

We can suppose that in normal conditions for visual perception, Daniel is quite good at perceiving the shapes and colors of objects like tomatoes correctly – he possesses ordinary, normal visual perceptual capacities with respect to these kinds of properties and objects. Now, however, he is not in normal conditions, since he has (unknowingly) taken a drug which induces hallucinations in him. Nevertheless, he is exercising his normal abilities to form perceptual beliefs on the basis of perceptual experiences. Therefore, by exercising these abilities, he forms the belief that there is a tomato in front of him. And the belief is correct (true). The belief is thus not just a shot in the dark. Rather, it is formed in a rational way. It is a rational belief.<sup>15</sup> Only because the conditions for exercising the relevant perceptual abilities are so bad is it the case that his perceptual experience is merely luckily correct. (In normal conditions, we can assume, his perceptual experiences are not merely luckily correct but very reliably correct.) But because the fact that there is a red tomato-shaped in front of Daniel is evidence for the presence of a tomato in front of him, Daniel’s belief has supporting evidence. It is supported by real evidence, it is ‘evidenced’, as I will call it. And Daniel is in possession of this evidence, since he represents it perceptually. Things appear to him to be a certain way in his perceptual experience, and things really are that way. So the way things are has entered into his mind. And this way things are is really evidence, or a reason, for his belief that there

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<sup>14</sup> See, as the classic on veridical hallucination, Lewis (1980).

<sup>15</sup> Equally, we can add that the belief is responsible and blameless (or even praiseworthy).



is a tomato in front of him.<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, I submit, Daniel's belief is not justified. It is rational and evidenced (and true), but not justified. Therefore, in the tomato case Daniel's belief is a kind of 'Gettier case for justification'.

Of course, one could object at this point by saying that unless Daniel genuinely perceives the relevant fact he is not really in possession of the evidence fact. And veridical hallucination does not amount to genuine perception. One could hold that only knowledge or perception of facts counts as possession of evidence.

I will come back to this objection in the next section. Suffice it to say for the moment that according to the objection, one loses the ability to distinguish between lucky possession of evidence (as in the case of veridical hallucination) and non-lucky possession of evidence (as in a case of genuine perception) and to carve out the commonality. And one would have to introduce a technical notion of 'quasi-possession of evidence' in order to adequately deal with all cases. But this will then be a mere reshuffling of terminology.

We could leave it at that and let the case rest on the intuition that Daniel's belief is not justified. But additional, supplementary intuitions can be evinced in order to further support the claim. First of all, there is the further intuition that a quite intimate relation holds between justification and reasons (or evidence). It is often said that a justified belief must be 'based on a reason'. The 'being based on a reason' here must be understood not merely as being in accordance with evidence (or being supported by evidence), however. Rather, a justified belief must be held *because of* the evidence supporting it. But it seems intuitively quite clear that Daniel's belief is not held because of the evidence, since the relation to the evidence is too accidental; it is merely in accordance with the evidence. And this is not good enough for being justified. Secondly, and related to the first point, there is an intuition that Daniel's condition is not as good as it could be, epistemically. His belief formation would be clearly better if he really *perceived* the evidence. Veridical hallucination connects him to the reason, but genuine perception would be an epistemically better condition. So intuitively, Daniel's belief ranks second-best, epistemically. Then, however, it seems appropriate to reserve the title of justification to the higher epistemic status. Thus we can conclude, again, that Daniel's

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<sup>16</sup> Please note that the evidence can be taken to be existential, i.e., there being a red, tomato-shaped object in front of Daniel. The fact that the relevant object is not perceived when the subject undergoes a veridical hallucination is thus not undermining the possession of evidence.

belief lacks justification. (It still deserves the title of being rational.) These considerations may stand in need of further elaboration, but initially at least, they seem to provide some further reason for thinking that Daniel's belief is not justified.<sup>17</sup>

Let us construct a second case, the 'wax case', as we can call it. In this case, everything is just like before, with the exception that the real tomato is replaced by a wax tomato which is having the same appearance as the real tomato. Perceptually, the wax object is not distinguishable from the real tomato. Daniel's perceptual experience, again, is hallucinatory, but veridical. There really is a red, tomato-shaped object in front of him – and that's how things appear to Daniel perceptually. He forms the same belief, namely, that there is a tomato in front of him. This time the belief is false.

Again, his belief is formed in a rational way, by exercising normal and quite good perceptual abilities. (Daniel still has and exercises normal, good perceptual abilities. Only the conditions for exercising them are bad, since Daniel has taken the drug.) And again, there is evidence for the presence of a tomato – misleading evidence, unfortunately. So Daniel's belief in the wax case is rational and evidenced. Nevertheless, it is not justified. Therefore, in the wax case Daniel's belief is again a kind of 'Gettier case for justification'.

In the wax case, Daniel's belief is false. Thus, it cannot be a Gettier case for knowledge. The second case, therefore, shows the independence of Gettier cases for justification from Gettier cases for knowledge. The two phenomena are really different.

### *3. Possession of evidence and justification*

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<sup>17</sup> Clayton Littlejohn agrees with the judgment that Daniel's belief is not justified. Cf. Littlejohn (2012). Littlejohn's diagnosis and overall view, however, is very different from mine. Most importantly, justified belief has to be true and justification is in the business of truth-tracking, according to Littlejohn. Justification comes from respecting the truth-norm and the normative reasons it gives to us, in Littlejohn's view. Justification is, roughly speaking, knowledge without the condition of environmental luck. (Littlejohn 2012, 239.) In my view, justification is in the business of evidence-tracking and not so close to knowledge. So even though I am happy to share with him the judgment about the cases of veridical hallucination, I fear that the commonality almost ends here.

In the following, I shall point out an assumption that I have been relying on, and I shall try to defend it to some extent. As already mentioned, possession of evidence is to be understood in a factive way. So if Daniel possesses evidence *e*, *e* has to obtain. What then is the relation of possession? – It seems to me, and I have been assuming in constructing the Gettier cases for justification, that correctly perceptually representing evidence is good enough for possession of evidence. Possession of evidence consist in something like ‘registering’, or ‘representing’, or ‘being aware of’ the evidence. A subject which correctly perceptually represents there being a red tomato-shaped object is in possession of evidence – namely, the fact that there is a red tomato-shaped object which is evidence for there being a real tomato. Call these evidential facts ‘perceptual facts’ (since they can directly be represented perceptually). Then, perceptual facts can serve as evidence for non-perceptual facts, such as facts about natural kinds or functional types. And by undergoing a correct perceptual experience as of a certain perceptual fact one is in fact in possession of it, in the relevant sense. One is aware of it. Whether this allows one to form a justified belief depends on whether the possession of evidence is due to the exercise of some reason tracking ability. If you are merely luckily in possession of the evidence (as in the cases of veridical hallucination) and your possession of evidence is not due to your exercise of a reason tracking ability, then you are not in a position to form a justified belief – even if you exercise a reason tracking ability. You can still form the ‘right’ belief – the belief which is supported by the evidence you possess. This belief then will be a virtuously, competently formed belief, and we can call it ‘rational belief’. And it is an evidenced belief since there really is evidence in favor of it. This then is, again, a Gettier case for justification.

Why should we think that correct perceptual representation is good enough for possession of evidence? Do we not need genuine perception (so that veridical hallucination does not count)? – One important argument is from the *analogy to the doxastic case of beliefs* about evidence. Intuitively, if one correctly believes that *p*, and the fact that *p* is evidence for the further fact that *q*, then one is in possession of evidence for *q*. One may luckily possess the evidence in this doxastic way, by simply luckily (correctly) believing that *p*. Or one may believe it in virtue of exercising a reason tracking ability. But one has the evidence, one possesses it, in either case. If one goes on and forms the belief that *q* on the basis of the belief that *p*, one can acquire a rational, evidenced belief. So correct doxastic representation is good

enough for possession of evidence. Analogously, correct perceptual representation should be good enough, too.<sup>18</sup>

For further support, one could appeal to considerations of what one is under an obligation to take into account in one's belief formation. Intuitively, if one believes that *p* and understands that it is evidence for *q*, then one is under the obligation of taking it into account in one's doxastic deliberation about whether to believe *q*. It does not directly matter how one came to believe that *p* and whether one exercised any reason tracking ability. The mere fact that one believes it puts one under an obligation.<sup>19</sup> If evidence is supposed to play this role, we must allow for the possibility of lucky possession of evidence.<sup>20</sup>

One qualification can be added, however. Perhaps, correct perceptual representation is not quite good enough for possession of evidence, simply because phenomenal consciousness might be missing. And there is a quite powerful intuition that only conscious (i.e., phenomenally conscious) perceptual representation counts as possession of evidence, and unconscious perceptual representation does not (such as in cases of blindsight). We can add this qualification. And still, we do not need genuine perception. Undergoing a conscious (correct) perceptual appearance is good enough for possession of evidence.<sup>21</sup>

By saying that correct (phenomenally conscious) perceptual representation, as occurring in cases of veridical hallucination, is good enough for possession of evidence, I

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<sup>18</sup> Non-doxastic possession of facts (true propositions) as evidence can be conceived of in a Fregean, conceptual way (McDowell) or a Russellian, non-conceptual way (Dretske, Burge). Both are representationalist views of basic perception. A anti-representationalist Relationalism (Campbell, Martin) will not allow for such non-doxastic possession of facts as evidence. In this paper I rely on a representationalist view of basic perception (which is my view anyway).

<sup>19</sup> The obligation, or requirement, can be understood either as a narrow scope requirement or a wider scope requirement (or both). Cf. Broome (2007), Kolodny (2007). (Many thanks to Susanne Mantel for pointing this out to me.)

<sup>20</sup> This is in line with the quite plausible position about evidence and defeaters developed by Bergmann. Cf. Bergmann (2006). The issue of defeaters and responsibility (obligation) deserves a more extensive treatment, of course.

<sup>21</sup> For a view which accords normative significance to phenomenal consciousness see, for example, Smithies (2011).

oppose certain accounts of possessing evidence, such as the knowledge account of Timothy Williamson's. (This in itself does not mean that I oppose Williamson's account of justification. We will come back to this issue soon.) The requirement that one know a fact in order to possess it as evidence is too demanding. I cannot go into a discussion of Williamson's arguments here. Suffice it to say that by requiring knowledge of evidence, one excludes the Gettier cases for justification described above. The price is that possessing evidence becomes a quite demanding status. In addition, the strategy of putting higher demands on possession of evidence leaves us with some questions concerning the cases of accidentally having evidence in mind without knowing it. Being aware of the evidence in such a way does not prevent one from using it appropriately, or responding to it appropriately. (How could one use the evidence without having it?) And, plausibly, it puts one under some obligations to use, or react to, the evidence appropriately. So, it seems preferable to allow for accidental possession of evidence. The distinction between accidental and non-accidental (competent) possession of evidence can be further illuminated by the following consideration. One of our *goals* in belief formation is to have beliefs which have some evidence in their favor, i.e., to have evidenced beliefs. (This goal is especially salient if we do not have at hand any competence for tracking the truth directly.) But this goal is to be distinguished from *the way* in which we can reach it, namely, by exercising abilities to track evidence. Possession of evidence can play a role in how we arrive at evidenced belief. One important way to arrive at evidenced belief is by becoming aware of the facts which are the evidence by the exercise of some reason tracking ability. In this way, one becomes competently, non-accidentally aware of the evidence. This, then, enables one to form the right, evidenced belief (by treating the evidence as evidence for the right thing). Becoming accidentally aware of the evidence, as in cases of veridical hallucination, equally enables one to do this (i.e. to treat to the evidence as evidence for the right thing). But nevertheless, the status of the result (or of the entire structure) is quite different. Only if one is competently aware of the evidence can one achieve a justified belief. Merely accidental awareness of evidence is not good enough. And after all, we have to keep in mind that there is a third case: merely forming an evidenced belief without any possession of evidence. This is the case of *entirely-luckily* evidenced belief. The goal of evidenced belief, thus, can be reached in at least three different ways: entirely-luckily, luckily (by lucky possession of evidence), or competently (by competent possession of evidence). It is important to keep apart the goal and the different ways of how to reach it.

Coming back to the knowledge account of possession of evidence, we can conclude that it in effect eliminates one way in which one can possess evidence and arrive at an evidenced belief, the ‘intermediate’ way of lucky possession of evidence. For, plausibly, to know the evidence is to be competently in possession of evidence. Now, competent possession of evidence is basically the right idea for an account of justification, indeed.<sup>22</sup> But we should not build the competence into the possession of evidence. Rather, we should build it into our account of justification, as an explicit condition. Justification, then, is the competent achievement of evidenced belief. In contrast, merely rational evidenced belief can be had by accidental possession of evidence. Competently possessing evidence, by the exercise of reason tracking abilities, puts one into a position to justifiably believe.<sup>23</sup>

#### *4. The new evil demon case: justification and rationality*

One might raise the following objection – call it the ‘*new evil demon objection*’: You have claimed that we have the intuition that in the tomato case, Daniel’s belief that *p* (that there is a red tomato in front of him) is not justified. But how about the case of the brain in a vat? Many have claimed that we have the intuition that the brain in a vat has justified beliefs, just as we ordinary subjects in our friendly environment.<sup>24</sup> Suppose that a corresponding brain in a vat –

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<sup>22</sup> There remains an issue about whether competent possession of evidence must take the form of knowing the evidence. I prefer to be more liberal, and to allow for perceptual reason tracking without knowledge. In this sense, I oppose Williamson’s account of justification. But the important commonality deserves to be highlighted: justification requires competent possession of evidence.

<sup>23</sup> In other respects, quite a lot of what Williamson says about the role of experience for knowledge and/or justification is entirely consistent with the virtue-theoretic perspective that I am taking on here. For example, Williamson mentions the “skill with which concepts are applied” and the “skillfulness of a performance” (Williamson 2007, 168). Experience can play the role of making one a *competent* concept possessor and, thus, the role of experience can extend beyond providing immediate evidence.

<sup>24</sup> The just-mentioned intuition about the new evil demon case was first discussed in Cohen (1984). Cohen claims that the deceived subject, sharing our experience, has “every reason for

call him ‘René’ – believes that *p* on the basis of having the same perceptual experience as Daniel (*ceteris paribus*). But there is no such tomato, and no object at all, so the belief is not based on evidence, since the perceptual experience is not correct (not satisfied). But many claim that in this case – the so-called ‘new evil demon scenario’ – René has a justified belief that *p*. If that is so, your claim that we have the intuition that Daniel’s belief is not justified lacks any plausibility. So there it is, a clash of intuitions. Surely, it would be (almost) incoherent to have both the intuition that Daniel’s belief is not justified and the intuition that René’s belief is justified. After all, if anything seems rather clear then it is the fact that Daniel is epistemically at least as well off as René and, indeed, that he is somehow better off. But taken that many do share the intuition that René’s belief is justified, we should be highly skeptical of your claim that we have the intuition that Daniel’s belief is not justified, to say the least. In other words, if we have the intuition that René’s belief is justified, it cannot be true that – as you claim – we also have the intuition that Daniel’s belief is not justified.

In response to this objection we can point out that we have essentially three options: We could hold that both subjects have a justified belief; or that Daniel’s belief is justified and René’s is not; or that both lack justification. (The fourth theoretical option that Daniel’s belief is not justified whereas René’s belief is justified lacks any plausibility. I will ignore it from now on.) In the following, I shall argue that we should choose the latter, third option: both subjects lack justification.

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holding our beliefs that we have in the actual world” (ibid., 281). I do not accept this claim, and it seems counterintuitive to me. (Littlejohn 2009 shares my intuition and provides some further considerations as to how and why the subject in the new evil demon case differs from the ordinary perceiving subject. Note that I do not share Littlejohn’s deontological account of epistemic justification.) In contrast, one can indeed say that the deceived subject’s beliefs are “reasonable”, as Cohen puts it. (Cf. Cohen 1984, 283.) But reasonableness is rather rationality, not justification. To claim that the concept of rationality (or reasonableness) is “the important epistemic concept, the one epistemologists have been concerned with” (ibid., 283) is to no avail here. Epistemologists have been (and should be) concerned with a variety of epistemic standings that could be called ‘justification’, and reasons-related justification is one of them and the one under investigation here. – Silins (2005) accepts the internalist intuition and tries to argue from it against externalism for evidence possession.

Let me make a preliminary remark before entering into the arguments. To bring in the case of René at this point raises various methodological issues surrounding intuitions and their role(s) for philosophical theorizing. I cannot go into this here, simply for reasons of space. This field of philosophy is particularly controversial and, therefore, it would be quite desirable to steer clear of any commitments. I will try to do so. But surely, at some point this will leave room for further maneuvers. An adequate treatment of the issues raised by dealing with several intuitions about a number of cases has to wait for another occasion. Here I will be content with providing a strategy of how to argue for the third option ('both lack justification'), or at least a sketch of such a strategy.

To begin with, consider the first option, i.e., the view that both subjects have a justified belief. A major problem for this view is that it *separates justification entirely from (possession of) evidence*. If even René is supposed to have a justified belief, though he lacks any evidence for what he believes (since his perceptual experience is entirely incorrect),<sup>25</sup> then surely Daniel has a justified belief as well. But this strongly suggests that the epistemic status of the beliefs that we are talking about is entirely independent of possession of evidence. Then, however, it becomes a real question what phenomenon we are talking about. 'Justification' can be used as a generic notion, covering quite different kinds of epistemic status, such as responsible or blameless belief, rational belief, reasons-related belief, entitled belief, and possibly more. This has been noted already at the beginning. The intuition (presented above) that Daniel's belief is not justified was meant to concern one of these, namely, the reasons-related notion of justification. Concerning *this* concept of justification, the reasons-related concept, my claim was that intuitively, Daniel's belief is not justified. And it seems to me that concerning this concept of justification, René's belief is not justified either. The intuition that René's belief is 'justified' can only be correct if it expresses some other concept of justification. I suspect that it is driven by the rational-belief concept of justification and/or the concept of responsible, blameless belief (or even praiseworthy belief).

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<sup>25</sup> One might wonder if René's perceptual experience cannot play the 'evidential role' in Williamson's sense, i.e., if his psychological state cannot be a piece of – psychological – evidence itself. But of course it is highly problematic to understand how psychological facts could provide evidence for beliefs about the external world – even if we grant for the moment that René has introspective, immediate self-knowledge of his experience. Here the famous problem of the external world is lurking in the bushes. Cf., for example, BonJour (1999).



And it has been granted from the very beginning that Daniel's belief is rational (and responsible and blameless, or even praiseworthy) – and so is René's belief. So Daniel's and René's belief share the epistemic status of being rational (and responsible and blameless, or even praiseworthy). This much is intuitively given and granted.<sup>26</sup> But our main interest here is with the specific concept of reasons-related justification. And we would mis-describe our intuition that René's and Daniel's beliefs are rational by calling them 'justified'. Here as elsewhere, we have to be careful to describe our intuitions in the right way and not to confuse similar concepts. (As Kripke has taught us: not an easy job). Distinguishing between rationality and justification – or between a reasons-related concept of justification and a rational-belief concept of justification (and the other specific concepts of justification) – is crucial here. And once the distinction is made, the right way to describe our intuitions is to deny justification (in the reasons-related sense) to René's belief.<sup>27</sup>

Consider the second option. Can we hold that Daniel's belief is justified whereas René's is not? Prima facie this sounds like a plausible position. After all, Daniel is in possession of evidence – in contrast to René. But on reflection, it seems that we should be

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<sup>26</sup> Distinguishing between blamelessness and praiseworthiness allows us to further distinguish between two different kinds of evil demon scenario subjects, namely, a 'hapless subject' which has been badly brought up and uses (subtly) fallacious patterns of reasoning and an excellent reasoner who uses impeccable reasoning patterns, as Brian Weatherson (2008) has convincingly shown. Intuitively, both subjects are doxastically blameless, but only the excellent reasoner is praiseworthy (in a way in which the hapless subject is not). Weatherson also convincingly argues that blamelessness and praiseworthiness are *in general* not the same, so the diagnosis is not *ad hoc*.

<sup>27</sup> That various concepts of justification can come apart has been argued by several philosophers. For example, Pryor has argued that blameless (responsible) belief and justified belief (in his sense of justificatorily supported belief) can come apart. See Pryor (2001), 114-15. Weatherson (2008) essentially shares the diagnosis presented here, i.e., the view that what is good about the deceived subject in the new evil demon case is the exercise of rationality (reasoning) and the blamelessness (or even praiseworthiness), and Weatherson agrees that this does not entail that the subject has a justified belief. Cf. Weatherson (2008), sc. 8. Last but not least, Alston has claimed that the term 'epistemic justification' is multiply ambiguous. Cf. Alston 2005, Alston 1993.

more demanding on what is required for justification, and deny that Daniel's belief is justified. The reason for this is simply that, even though there is a connection to real evidence, the connection is not of the right kind in order to achieve justification. Once we admit that a connection to real evidence is needed, we should be careful to distinguish between various different relations to evidence. And it is now a further question whether mere possession of evidence is the right link to evidence. And intuitively, the right connection is not just any kind of possession of evidence. Lucky, accidental possession of evidence is not the right link. One has to have the evidence in a competent, non-accidental way. Only then does one achieve genuine justification. Possession of evidence may be a good state, epistemically speaking. But is it not the same as justification. At least one should not be rash on deciding whether purely accidental possession of evidence is good enough for justification.

The second option, therefore, is an unstable intermediate position. Once one has moved from the first option to the second, one should move on to the third one, i.e., to the view that both beliefs lack justification. It provides perfectly sufficient conceptual resources for capturing all the epistemically significant differences. René lacks evidence, in contrast to Daniel (and a corresponding ordinary, good case of genuine perception). Daniel is better off than René since he is at least in possession of some reason for his belief. But he is still not in a position for having a justified belief since he is merely luckily in possession of evidence, and not reliably and competently. These are the right, appropriate descriptions of the cases. The third option, therefore, is the best one. The conditions on justification (in the reasons-related sense) exclude both René (quite obviously) and Daniel (not so obviously). The phenomenon we are after – belief which is appropriately linked to reasons (evidence) – is a bit more demanding than one might initially have expected. Considering cases like Daniel helps to make us aware of a component or condition that is usually or normally satisfied since we are often genuinely perceiving and, thus, in competent possession of evidence. It is unsurprising that we might tend to overlook this constitutive element of justification. But Daniel's case brings it to our attention. Properly described, and without confusing different concepts, we have the intuition that Daniel's belief lacks justification.

##### *5. Justification and unified virtue epistemology*

Finally, let me end with some remarks on the broader view of justification which arises from the just mentioned considerations. These considerations favor a *virtue-theoretic account of justification*. Justification is the competent achievement of evidenced belief. One is connected to objective evidence in an intimate, non-accidental way. One arrives at an epistemic goal – evidenced belief – in a competent way, that is, by exercising a corresponding competence. The competence relevant for justification is a reason tracking ability. For knowledge, it is a truth tracking ability. But the structure is the same, abstract structure of ‘success from ability,’ as Greco puts it in his account of knowledge. In the case of knowledge, the explanation for why one has formed a true belief appeals to a truth tracking competence. The ‘AAA structure’ is present, as Sosa puts it: the belief is apt, that is, accurate (true) because adroit.<sup>28</sup> In the case of justification, the explanation for why one has formed an evidenced belief appeals to a reason tracking competence. The belief has evidence in its favor *because* one has exercised a reason tracking ability. This common structure is what really makes the two cases described *Gettier* cases. Thus, the prospects for a *unified virtue-epistemology* of both knowledge and justification seem promising.

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<sup>28</sup> John Turri has complained that a fourth element is missing in Sosa’s account, namely, the manifestation condition (the *true* belief has to be the manifestation of the cognitive ability). See Turri (2011). It is unclear to me, however, whether this charge is fair to Sosa. I tend to think that Sosa already has the manifestation condition as part of his account, at least in his later writings. If not, let us add it. (And Turri admits that one might view his account as a “charitable way of interpreting and consistently developing the basic idea” (ibid., 8) that can be found in Sosa’s and other virtue epistemologists’ writings.) For some more considerations on what the relevant abilities (competences) are, and what makes them epistemically valuable, see Hofmann (2013b).

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