Abstract
Two models dominate the debate on the theory of the firm. Under the management- power model, decision-making power exclusively belongs to corporate insiders (officers and directors). The competing shareholder-power model contemplates increasing shareholder power to limit managerial authority. Both models are focused on managerial agency costs and assume that insiders and shareholders are engaged in a competitive struggle for corporate power. However, increasingly, the insider-shareholder dynamic is collaborative, not competitive.
This Seminar will trace the development of insider-shareholder collaboration and present the novel collaborative model. It will demonstrate how collaboration adds value that is lost under unilateral decision- making by the board or the shareholders. The growing importance of shareholder collaboration requires rethinking several principles of corporate law.
These issues are of great interest in Europe and Luxembourg, especially in view of legislative developments such as the revised Shareholders Rights Directive which is due to be implemented in 2019 and the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR).